Leon Trotsky: Our Work in the Communist Party

March 20, 1939

[Writings of Leon Trotsky, Vol 11, 1938-1938, New York ²1974, p. 237-246]

The discussion was opened with the reading of the following excerpts from two letters:

Letter from Trotsky:

"I see again from your letter, as from my discussion with two women comrades who came here from New York, that there exists a very poor state of affairs as regards the work of our party inside the Communist Party. There are no connections at all and there is a certain fatalism in this respect. 'We are too weak. We do not have enough manpower to begin a systematic action. Etc.

"I find it absolutely false, dangerous, almost to say, criminal. It is my opinion that we must register all the comrades who came from the Communist Party within the last two or three years, those who have personal connections with the Stalinists, and so on. Organize small discussions with them, not of a general, but of a practical, even an individual character. Elaborate some very concrete plans and re-discuss the matter after a week or so. On the basis of such a preparatory work a commission can be crystallized for this purpose.

"The end of the Spanish tragedy, the truth about the activities of the Stalinists in Spain, and such articles as the excellent correspondence from Terence Phelan in Paris, will inevitably create some disintegration in the Stalinist ranks. We must be present to observe these processes and to utilize the opportunities presented. It is the most important task of the party in this period."

Letter to Trotsky:

"I read your letter with a good deal of attention and discussed its contents with several comrades. There are some attempts being made about the CP, but they are local in character and far, far from being handled organizationally as the first task of the party. A comrade of very militant and intelligent character considered your suggestions very good and thought they could lead to success. Other comrades higher in the party were not so confident.

"Their doubts take the following line: The membership of the CP as a whole is not more than a year or a year and a half old. These members came into the party not for the struggle to achieve communism but in order to better fight for capitalist democracy. The experience of our comrades in contact with CP rank-and-file members in many parts of the country shows that these CPers speak an entirely different language from ours. When we talk politics with them, they simply do not know what we are talking about. In line with this I have learned from a very close friend of mine in California, an artist sympathetic to us but not a party member, that the CP is making an intensive drive among university circles in California and making some success solely on a platform of fighting for democracy. The members they are gaining are people I knew in college as liberals, believers in democracy who thought even the Nation very radical — and they have not changed one whit in their beliefs. The CP has moved over to them. In addition, the activity of the CP members is on an incredibly low level. They are not trained the least bit in the class struggle but are merely being roped to the war machine. If these people leave the CP as they have in the past by the thousands, they do not come to us, but become apathetic or material for the fascists. Work in the CP is extremely difficult because the membership is atomized — the opposite pole to the centralization of the leadership — there are no possibilities for members to meet together and discuss on any scale larger than a single small branch or unit.

"All the comrades agree that we know too little about the composition and happenings within the CP and agreed that we could do much more. I proposed work on a national scale be instituted of an organizational nature, and one of the higher comrades wondered how I would like to do that kind of work. Naturally the problem of breaking up this organization and initially of discovering what goes on within it, interests me keenly, but there are many comrades far better fitted for this work than 1.

"Yes, there is some skepticism among some of the people. When I argue that a split is inevitable in the CP and that it cannot but help educate to a degree the people who stay even a short time in its ranks — even the Daily Worker uses the socialist background to some degree – they agree that there is a contradiction in their ideology but cannot see gains for us.

"One curious observation-some of the people who were among the foremost militants in the third period are now devout followers of Roosevelt in the CP. They listen to his speeches over the radio as if God himself were speaking out of a rock. They are not cynical; they really are followers of Roosevelt. What can be done with people like that?"

Trotsky: It seems to me that these two letters are a sufficient introduction and that possibly the comrades will express their opinions about the possibility of work within the Stalinist party.

O'Brien: I could add a little on the relations of our members to the Stalinists from my experiences while I was in New York on the Appeal. From the field we had complaints whenever we printed articles against the Stalinists. Comrades would write to us that now we were trying to build a mass party and that we should make our paper a paper for the masses, not with our faces turned constantly toward the Stalinist party. To them, a turn towards the workers meant a turn away from the Stalinist party. Yet whenever the same comrades would write for the Appeal, the realities of the party's work demanded that they write against the Stalinists. Other comrades who complained about attacks on the CP, when asked for concrete suggestions, could only suggest further attacks!

Their objections, it seems to me, were based on the quantity of the anti-Stalinist material. Certainly a review of the Socialist Appeal will show that 60 percent of the articles are against the Communist Party. But the work seems too diffuse, it is shooting into the sky. What is needed is a concrete plan and a consistent approach to the Stalinists.

As I listened to this letter with its analysis of the CP membership, it seems that our approach must take that analysis into consideration. It must deal with fundamentals — if the CP membership is interested only in "preserving democracy" we must deal with the question in that aspect. If we are serious in our desire to influence the present membership of the CP, we must be willing to attempt the task of educating them to a revolutionary viewpoint. We cannot attempt to speak to the new Stalinist rank and file from a revolutionary premise. Nor can we expect them to be familiar with the history of the Comintern.

I would suggest for the present a definite column, to be conducted by some person specifically for that job, in the paper once or twice a week if necessary, to hit on two or three fundamental points and hammer away at them each week. Our anti-Stalinist campaign, although concrete on a local scale, on a national scale is incomprehensible to the CP rank and file. Coupled with the press, of course, we must do organizational work within the CP so that we can both reap a benefit from, and direct and guide, the press.

Lankin: I believe that the only way we can really find out what is going on in the CP is to actually send people in for a certain period and give them special tasks to do — qualified people. I believe, and it has been my opinion for a long time, that so far as actually gaining members is concerned, our gains from this organization can only be small. There are few revolutionary elements in the CP. Almost all those people who joined before Hitler came to power, went through the third period, and now accept the new line, are absolutely worthless. They are dishonest and degenerate. No one can accept the third period and now the new line and do it honestly. The new people, who joined after the third period, are not revolutionists, but for them there is a certain amount of hope. Among these people there are a certain number of workers who came in, not on a revolutionary line, but because it was their first contact with the radical movement and because they were interested in "maintaining democracy." Many of them came from the trade unions. We could win some of these elements with our work in the Stalinist party. But we must send in qualified people to remain only for a certain length of time.

Guy: I agree with what Comrade Lankin has to say, but in order to be able to send people in, they must be entirely unknown and qualified comrades who can do the work we want done and that is going to be very difficult to find.

Cornell: What Comrade Guy says is quite correct — it is very difficult to send qualified comrades, or for that matter any of our comrades, into the CP. Our people are known, they are articulate, and the mere fact of being Trotskyists has given them something of a reputation. Even though they may be sent to another locality, halfway across the country, the Stalinists also move about and it would not take long to discover them. Even with considerable sacrifice, their activity in the CP is short lived You may suggest that we can leave within the CP those people whom we are winning over. This too presents difficulties. The change does not take place overnight, but develops over a considerable period. As their doubts and questionings increase, they expose themselves more and more, until they become known as Trotskyists even before they actually face the fact themselves. They expose themselves even before they come to us. If, through some fortunate combination of circumstances, this should not be the case, they are not usually trained to carry on such careful work nor do they have the political background. If left in the CP they would be far more likely to become demoralized and leave the movement entirely than to bring new members to us.

Finding people to send in is a difficult task, but obviously it must be done, and together with it the very essential work of careful and alert planning and direction.

O'Brien: At the time of Comrade Gould's visit here, we discussed the project of circulating a mimeographed bulletin or paper within the CP itself. Have you heard of anything being done along that line?

Trotsky: Nothing is being done, as we see from the letter just read. And some comrades believe that it is not possible to do anything or to win many comrades. It is also the opinion expressed by Comrade Lankin. We have two tasks that are connected, but at the same time must be considered separately. One task is to compromise, smash, crush the CP as an obstacle for our movement. If we win out, many will come to us. But now the Communist Party is the most important obstacle. The first obstacle was the Socialist Party — weaker than the Communist Party. We tried to pass through this obstacle, and met with some success. Now the Socialist Party, as an obstacle, does not exist for us. The Old Guard is a petty-bourgeois, semi-liberal organization without direct influence in the workers' movement. And the Norman Thomas section is dying. The task resolves itself on the CP. What Comrade O'Brien tells us of the objections of many comrades -do not make direct polemics among the CPers, better approach the CP in a constructive manner — this signifies an anonymous approach. They hope in this way to avoid the friction and the blows. It shows that in this form we can see some fear before the public opinion of the Stalinists. It signifies that the Stalinists are strong and we are weak. This objection shows that the Stalinists are now the next and most important obstacle in our way. And we cannot answer, as some comrades do, that sociologically they are made up not of proletarian elements primarily, but that what proletarian elements they have are demoralized and we cannot win them. It is not what Comrade Lankin says, because he proposes some action within the party. The comrades in the letter say they are skeptical about the work in general. The first task is to compromise this party in the eyes of the workers. The second is to win as many as possible from the ranks of the party.

In his speech before the eighteenth congress of the CPSU Manuilsky said that the American Communist Party had a membership of 20,000 and now has 90,000. I am not sure that it is correct, but it is possible that they now have around this number. How many workers? I do not know.

In this letter, as in our discussion with comrades, we hear that the Stalinists' growth is due to the petty-bourgeois elements. It is almost certain that the great majority are petty-bourgeois elements, but I ask our comrades about the influence in the trade unions. In the CIO they are very influential. Where does their influence in the trade unions come from — is it from the rank and file or from the top? We know that the Lovestoneites have influence through the top, by personal connections, etc. How is it with the Stalinists — is it based on the nuclei of members, or through the top leadership? I do not know the answer. Do they have organized nuclei in the trade unions? Are they numerous? Do they have meetings and accept instructions from the party? It is only hypothetical that the influence of the Stalinists comes in a double way — to a certain degree from a direct influence of a strata of workers, and to a greater degree through the apparatus. They have a powerful apparatus, with educated fakers who are very useful to other fakers less educated. The combination is quite natural. But at the same time, does not this bureaucratic apparatus have a base in the rank and file? They must have some base in the masses. If it is so, it proves that among the 90,000 there are many thousands of workers and sufficient influential workers.

Have we a map of the trade unions and a map of the influence of the Stalinists in the trade unions? We must have such a map with statistics, characteristics, etc., of all the trade unions, nationally and locally. We cannot fight a foe without a previous reconnaissance. We must penetrate, we must have more posts in the trade unions, we must penetrate into the Communist Party. The trade unions are more or less democratic and we are better able to work there. We must generalize, analyze, summarize, concretize all the information we have and create a map of the trade unions and the influence of the Stalinists, because the trade union movement is the most important field for us. Here the Stalinists come into direct conflict with the interests of the trade unions. We have seen it in the auto union and in others. And as Comrade O'Brien says, our criticism is correct, but it is too abstract. It cannot reach the rank-and-file worker in the trade union. Our criticism is based upon our general conceptions, but not upon the worker's own experience. We cannot do this because we do not have the information, because we do nothing in order to have it. Let us suppose for a moment that the whole influence of the Stalinists in the trade unions comes not through the workers but only through their apparatus composed of the petty-bourgeois elements and bureaucrats. It is absolutely exaggerated — impossible -but for the moment we will accept this view, which confirms the opinion that we cannot win many members; but even in this case, we must approach the workers in general in the trade unions in order to split and compromise this apparatus. It is not homogeneous. It is composed of Jimmy Higginses, bureaucrats, and fakers. The CP also has Jimmy Higginses who are honest and devoted.

Comrade Lankin says that people who passed through the third period experience and now the new orientation are absolutely demoralized and unworthy. The bureaucrats yes, but the workers no — not even the majority. In the third period they had a series of defeats and they felt the necessity of changing the policy. It was the same in France. Then the Comintern proposed a new way. The leaders told them that this was a maneuver. These workers were not educated and they had a very confused conception of the value of a maneuver. They knew that the Bolsheviks had used maneuvers with success. It got worse through the years. They became more and more involved and could not find a way out. They passed through a moral crisis. A worker who is awakened by an organization is thankful to it and it is not easy to break with it, particularly if he cannot find a new road. We consider him as lost too prematurely. It is not correct.

I repeat that there must be an opposition to the bureaucracy at the top. The top is omnipotent and the modest functionaries must feel that it is not a comradely organization. It is one line of friction in the organization itself. We must find in the bureau the woman who cleans the floors, and those a bit higher, and begin with them.

On the other side are political contradictions in the apparatus, the leading and semi-leading elements are of two kinds. The leaders -part of them -have the "cosmopolitan" education of Stalinist culture and are ready to betray anything for it. They are the active, influential, and absolutely vicious minority of the apparatus. But there are others. In this large party it is inevitable that there should be new ones -Yankees -not "international" rascals. They are honest Yankees. They are devoted to Roosevelt, democracy, etc. If the Soviet Union marches together with the United States then these two parts of the bureaucracy can remain together with a' sort of friendship. It will reflect the friendship of Roosevelt and Stalin, and will be reflected in the Communist Party itself. But if the politics of Roosevelt and the Soviet Union are in opposition, we will have friction in the apparatus itself. Possibly it is going on now, but we know nothing about it. If, at the proper moment, we can put a clear question to the members, or in a review, then we can project a split, if we know what is going on.

I believe that we should organize a census of all party comrades who have connections or knowledge about the people or proceedings in the CP or the nuclei in the trade unions. Locally and nationally. Then convoke them and discuss what they know and the material they have. Give them two or three days or a week to complete the information, because in most cases they will have abandoned their relationships. They can establish them again. Then convoke these comrades again and discuss concrete plans. They are advised to see a certain person, or to send a brother or a sister to see him. Elementary and practical means of approach are elaborated. By and by an organization can be established, which must do work of two kinds: one, very delicate and illegal work which must be organized only from the top, locally and nationally, working closely with the rank and file; and another, a general penetration in the Stalinist ranks. Comrade Cornell says that the comrades become demoralized if they are left to work in the CP. It is because they are isolated. It is very difficult to work in an atmosphere of falsehood and lies. If their work is systematized and they have regular meetings with the committee, are given the necessary help and understanding in meeting their problems and even meet with some success, then there will not be the demoralization. We must reject the sociological fatalism, begin the political work and organize it on a local and national scale.

Lankin: I would like to add another word on what I said. When I said that we must send qualified comrades into the CP, I did not mean that we should send in the leadership. I believe that it is sufficient for this work to send in some wide-awake rank and filers. I believe it is goo^d to send in certain rank-and-file comrades who understand and can explain our program, to work under a committee. Also, there are many ways of joining the CP: through the fraternal organizations, because here they are not given a third degree, through the clubs, or through a union. Some, who are not known, can even join the party directly. Many who join the CP fraternal organizations are approached to join the CP.

Another question you raised. You asked the question whether the Stalinists really have influence through the rank and file or through the top. I believe that the bulk of the influence is only through the top, because they are in a position to buy influence in many cases. When the CP controls a union, it does so because it gives its whole support to a bureaucrat who does not carry a book in the CP.

Gray: When I was in the Young Communist League and in a Trotskyite nucleus within it, we issued a mimeographed paper for a few weeks. The effect of this paper was remarkable even for such a short duration and had it been continued there would have been far better results than there were. The reason — one of the chief reasons — that the paper ceased was because of the lack of guidance and direction from the CLA. The CPers really did read the paper and derived some benefit from it. It caused a great deal of discussion. If it could be done then, it can be done now, because the issues now are much clearer than they were five years ago.

O'Brien: At the time we discussed the project of a bulletin, I felt that we did not have enough people in the CP to carry it out. Through the discussion I realized that it would be done from the outside. But nothing has been done.

Trotsky: Nothing has been done. During the crisis with the Norman Thomas people such work was a commonplace. After this, the new step is the work within the CP. We also discussed it with the comrades who were here and it was a commonplace that it must be done and it will be done. It has not been done. However that is not a reproach. It is possible that after leaving the Socialist Party a closed organization was created which was satisfied or dissatisfied with itself. As a transitory step it is comprehensible, but it is dangerous. It might degenerate into a sect. Such a danger was vanquished by the entry into the Socialist Party. Now it is necessary to develop our work against the real obstacle.

The voice of the comrades is interesting — please do not polemicize openly against the Stalinists. It is necessary to awaken the opinion of our own comrades. We often say that the real field of activity is the trade union, but there we find the same task, the Stalinists.